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possible. The resulting book manages to present a compact, but highly informative 
and enlightening, overview of (many of) the most relevant topics in the modern phi-
losophy of language.                 
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Press. 
This book presents a deep and detailed reliabilist account of knowledge that attempts 
to overcome the central sceptical arguments (the regress argument, arguments based 
on sceptical hypotheses and the problem of the criterion), which is worthwhile on its 
own. It is an extremely suggestive and dense analysis that surpasses the task of offer-
ing a theory of knowledge and goes deep into our metaphysical outlook. The book has 
this double aspect. Firstly, it tries to concede to the sceptic as much as possible, with 
the result that he proposes a change in our way of conceiving the goal of cognition, 
that is, a middle position between realism and anti-realism, in order to defuse the 
sceptical threat. But, secondly, although the motivation is anti-sceptical, the account of 
knowledge presented is, as the author himself asserts, “largely independent of how it 
affects the prospects of the sceptical arguments” (p. viii). 
   In Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson jolted the philosophical community 
with a series of striking claims that prima facie seemed quite hard to accept, but which 
were so compellingly argued that it proved very difficult to reject them. These claims 
included among them, that knowledge is not to be analysed in terms of belief and jus-
tification, but that it can be used to elucidate the latter concepts, and also that 
knowledge is a mental state. One has quite the same feeling regarding Zalabardo’s 
book. It is full of striking claims, but so well argued that it is difficult not to end up 
convinced of their truth, their initial implausibility notwithstanding. 
 Zalabardo argues for a reliabilist account of knowledge, according to which evi-
dence is not necessary for knowing. This allows us, on his view, to block those scepti-
cal lines of argument we have just referred to, since all of them rest on what he calls 
the evidential constraint, i.e. that knowledge requires adequate evidence. Particularly, he 
maintains that evidence is not necessary for non-inferential knowledge. It is fair to say 
at this point that the author conceives evidence in a propositional way: only proposi-
tions can be evidence. This may help to understand why non-inferential knowledge is 
possible without evidence. His account of knowledge is based on Nozick’s truth-
tracking account, but in a revised form (construed in terms of conditional probabili-
ties, instead of counterfactuals and possible worlds), and restricted to a kind of non-
inferential knowledge. So the claim is: it is not necessary for inferential knowledge to 
track the truth. But some qualifications are in order. Whereas Nozick’s truth tracking 
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amounts to sensitivity (Nozick’s third clause is: “If p were false, S would not believe 
that p”) plus adherence, as he calls Nozick’s fourth clause (“If p were true, S would be-
lieve that p”), Zalabardo maintains, instead, that only sensitivity, not adherence, is 
necessary for the truth-tracking kind of knowledge. So conceived, truth tracking is a 
kind of non-inferential knowledge. In addition, there are two other kinds of 
knowledge which do not (need to) track the truth: inferential knowledge and the so-
called knowledge by default, whose object are standing beliefs, i.e. beliefs that do not 
result from the operation of cognitive mechanisms, or, as he puts it, those which we 
have an innate predisposition to form “that is largely independent of input, but we are 
not equipped to detect [their] truth value” (p. 137). Standing beliefs are “that our ex-
periences are produced by the kind of physical world that we take ourselves to inhabit 
[...], that objects continue to exist when we are not perceiving them” (p. 137), etc. 
With regard to these beliefs truth is a sufficient condition for knowledge. But, for 
them to be knowledge it is not necessary that they track the truth, not even that we 
have adequate evidence to support them. 
 Concerning inferential knowledge, evidence (E) has itself to be known; and also 
has to be known that E gives an adequate support to p. That is, in order to know that 
p on the basis of evidence E, S has to know that E and also that E adequately       
supports p. Support is an objective probabilistic relation: p is very likely to be true if E 
is true (chapter 4 is devoted to further specify the conditions of this relation of        
adequate support). S cannot know that p on the basis of E if either E is not true or the 
required objective probability does not obtain. It is not easy to argue for this without 
commitment to an exaggerated intellectualist model and also to either an infinite      
regress or a vicious circle, but Zalabardo succeeds in presenting it in such a way that it 
is not obvious at all that he falls pray of these problems. E can be known non-
inferentially, then both the regress and the circle can be prevented, and it is not       
required that the belief in E supports p is a conscious belief. 
 Chapter 5 examines this model of inferential knowledge and tests it against some 
classical puzzles, as Gettier’s counterexamples. Since in Gettier’s original cases the in-
ference is based on a false premise, they cannot count as knowledge. Probably this is 
one of the reasons for requiring that the belief in evidence is true. Since the beliefs in 
the premises are false, they cannot be knowledge and cannot then give adequate sup-
port to the inferential belief, which cannot consequently be knowledge either. The 
problem is that we might devise cases in which the evidence is not false, which leads 
Zalabardo to a slight modification on his account of inferential knowledge. According 
to him, what happens in Gettier’s cases is that “the contentious proposition can be 
made true by several recognizably distinct states of affairs” (p. 91). So, he adds a new 
constraint to his account: the requirement that evidence that makes p true is acquired 
in the way that it actually made p true, i.e., that the evidential support is not misplaced. 
The problem, in my opinion, is that this proviso cannot solve other Gettier-style cases 
of inferentially justified true belief, particularly those in which the prima facie reason 
for believing p is defeated by an unknown defeater which in turn is also defeated. In 
these cases the way in which p is made true is the same that evidence indicates;    
however, it is not clear that the subject knows that p. For instance, imagine that John, 
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a laboratory assistant, believes that the first flask on the shelf of a particular display 
cabinet contains acid, because yesterday he dipped a litmus paper in its liquid and it 
turned red, and afterwards he locked the cabinet. However, unbeknownst to John,  
Peter, an envious colleague, stole the key and substituted that flask of acid for an  
identical flask full of water. Nevertheless, just a few minutes ago, Peter has regretted 
having done that, and has restored the original flask to its place, before secretly        
returning the key. Neither his reformulation of misplacement, “E’s support for H is 
misplaced just in case there is a true proposition X such that E doesn’t confirm H & X” 
(p. 93), nor even his added principle PI: “S can have inferential knowledge of H based 
on the evidence provided by E only if S’s belief in E confirms H” (p. 98), can avoid 
this kind of counterexamples. Moreover, the introduction of PI has the (unwelcome) 
consequence that knowledge closure is not universally valid, as Zalabardo honestly 
recognizes. 
 After offering his thoroughly elaborated account of knowledge, Zalabardo comes 
back, in chapter 7, to check it against the sceptical challenge. The output is the one 
that might be foreseen. Reliabilist accounts get to deal with the sceptical challenge by 
giving up the iterative principle of knowledge (S knows that p iff S knows that S knows 
that p). Hence, on this view, one can know even if one does not know that one 
knows. But then, even though reliabilist accounts can respond to the kinds of sceptical 
arguments addressed in the first chapter (the regress argument, those arguments based 
on sceptical hypotheses and the problem of the criterion), they are unable to cope 
with the sceptical challenge concerning reflective knowledge. As Zalabardo contends, 
the former sceptical arguments were unsound, since one of their premises (the eviden-
tial constraint) was false. But this latter type of sceptical challenge “doesn’t rest on any 
assumptions that wouldn’t be licensed by [my] account of knowledge” (p. 163). 
Hence, according to the account of knowledge he offers (which aims to be the best 
available version of reliabilism), even when we know that p, we cannot know that our 
belief that p is true (conversely, that we do not falsely believe that p), then it cannot 
defuse scepticism. However, insofar as the reliabilist account is correct, Zalabardo   
argues, the sceptical difficulties result, “not from an incorrect analysis of knowledge, 
but from a mistaken construal of cognition” (p. 166), and he closes the book (chapter 
8) with an interesting outline of a “middle position” between realism and anti-realism. 
A metaphysical outlook, as we said at the beginning, that deserves to be attended with 
care, as the whole book does. 
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